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1.  Introduction. 
  Every quarter the Federal Reserve publishes its Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey on Bank Lending Practices.
1  Senior Loan Officers are asked about lending 
conditions in US credit markets.  Many of the questions are descriptive and idiosyncratic, 
but some are quantifiable and systematic and these answers have been compiled into time 
series.  About 60 large banks that together account for more than half of the dollar 
amount of loans made by banks in the US are asked. (Also, about 17 large foreign banks 
are also asked, but their responses are not a part of the compiled time series.) 
Senior Loan Officers in banks throughout the nation occupy a unique place the in 
economy and consequently it may be that as a group, they have some insights into the 
economy that may be particularly useful in understanding aspects of economic activity.  
The point of this paper is to ask whether that is actually true:  do the responses contained 
in the survey have information in them beyond what is otherwise available.  Do the senior 
loan officers know anything special? 
The survey began in 1966.  While the survey contains a large number of 
questions, only one has been asked since the beginning of the survey in such a way as to 
provide a useful time series of responses.  Previous work has shown the results of this 
survey worthwhile for predicting real economic activity.  Beginning in 1990 the survey 
                                                           
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys   2
began systematically and consistently inquiring about lending conditions in some specific 
markets, and it now produces twelve useful time series.  
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether the useful information contained in 
their responses is due to the unique position of the survey participants in the economy 
which gives them an inside view of bank behavior and thus influences the rest of the 
economy, or whether the bank lending officers are just a well informed group of people 
that do not otherwise have any information peculiar to them.  In other words, are the 
banks lending officers any different from any other well informed group of people?    
 
2.  The Survey 
  The survey began in the mid 1960s and included a question asking about the 
change in willingness of the lending officers to make consumer loans – more, much 
more, less, much less, or about the same.  While this is a good catch-all question 
regarding changes in the economic outlook, it does not provide any insight into specific 
market conditions.  An increased willingness to lend may be the result of a better pool of 
loan applicants due to overall increased loan demand, or it could reflect a decrease in 
demand where the weaker applicants are dropping out, or it could even be a sign that 
lenders believe that economic growth will support the making of more marginal loans 
than would have been profitable before.  Or any combination or permutation of the three. 
Five possible answers were allowed:  much less, less, the same, more and much more, 
and those answers were tabulated in a diffusion index.   
In addition to the willingness to lend question, a number of ad hoc queries were 
asked that called for open-ended answers.  It is intuitively appealing that the Fed would   3
like to systematically question the banking industry’s lending officers about various 
matters of mutual interest.  This continues to the present.  Absent any other source of 
news, the Senior Loan Officer Survey provides a good source of ad hoc information 
about the economy. 
 Through the history of the survey several attempts have been made to 
systematically build a set of time series diffusion indices that would be more useful in 
identifying specific changes to lending market conditions.  The try in the early 1990s 
took hold and the survey added some market-specific condition questions that could 
provide a rough form of supply/demand identification:  Is there an increase in demand?  
Are you tightening lending standards?  Are you increasing spreads over deposit rates?   
There is now a long enough time series to address the information content of these more 
specific banking-related question results. 
  Schreft and Owens (1991) provide an excellent history of the survey and discuss 
many of its shortcomings in detail.  First, although the survey has been conducted since 
the mid 1960s the questions have changed so that there is a limited consistent time series 
prior to the early 1990s.  Lown, Morgan and Rohatgi (2000) examine the usefulness of 
the diffusion time series and find evidence that the commercial credit lending standards 
diffusion index, after controlling for other explanatory variables, is useful in predicting 
loan growth, GDP growth and various measures of business activity.  They also put the 
commercial lending standards diffusion index into a VAR and find that in response to a 
credit standard tightening shock, GDP growth, the Federal Funds rate and loan growth 
rates all significantly decline within two quarters and, while Fed Funds and GDP 
thereafter quickly recover, the effect lasts an extended period of time in lending.   4
The contribution of this paper is to extend this work in an important dimension: 
whether other market-condition questions in the Loan Officer Survey are useful in 
predicting the actions of the banking system?  It may be, consistent with previous 
research, that the more ambiguous part of the Senior Loan Officers survey provides 
useful short-term predictive information.  That result, however, might be found by 
surveying any similarly well-informed group of agents.  The point of surveying Senior 
Loan Officers, presumably, is because it provides some insight into actions in the 
banking sector.  That is, the Senior Loan Officers are involved in some process (the 
banking sector) that influences the macro variable and thus the members of the panel 
surveyed occupy some unique position in the economy.  If the Senior Loan Officer 
survey does not inform predictions of banking sector activity, but does inform predictions 
of macro variables, then we might conclude that the panel is a group of well informed 
people that are not otherwise particularly special place other than their unique place in the 
banking industry.  
 
3.  The Data.   
  The longest running of the survey questions is the net percentage of respondents 
indicating more willingness to make consumer installment loans.  This series begins in 
the third quarter of 1966.  The question is the most unspecific of those in the data set and 
is really asking for a judgment about the near future prospect for the economy.  
Presumably a net increase in the lenders willingness to extend loans to consumers 
indicates some increased confidence in the immediate outlook for the economy.  In the 
tables of results, it is denoted with the mnemonic “Willing Cons Inst.”   5
  Questions regarding Commercial and Industrial loans became standardized in the 
second quarter of 1990.  The answers to the survey questions are tabulated as the net 
percentage of domestic banks reporting tightening standards for Commercial and 
Industrial loans, and the net percentage of domestic banks reporting increased spreads of 
loan rates over the bank’s cost of funds.  Both of these questions are broken down 
between conditions for “small” firms seeking loans and “large and medium” firms 
seeking loans.  The questions are not so much a matter of subjective feeling, but rather 
are measures of what marginal changes the banks are actually making on the supply side 
of the lending market.  The mnemonics for the four series in the tables of results are “LM 
C&I tight,” “Small C&I tight,” “LM C&I spread” and “Small C&I spread,” respectively. 
In the fourth quarter of 1991 a series was added summarizing the net percentage 
of respondents reporting stronger demand for Commercial and Industrial loans, again 
divided by firm size.  This was intended to capture something about how the responding 
lending officers view marginal changes on the demand side of the Commercial and 
Industrial market. The series are denoted “LM C&I Demand up” and “Small C&I 
Demand up,” respectively. 
  Also added in the fourth quarter of 1991 were two series on the net percentage of 
respondents reporting increased demand for consumer loans, divided between residential 
mortgages and consumer loans.  This gave the survey some indication of how lending 
officers saw marginal changes in the demand for loans from consumers. The mnemonics 
“Mort Demand up” and “Cons Loans demand.”  This followed the adding, in 1990:3, a 
series on the net percentage of respondents reporting tightening mortgage standards 
(denoted “Mort tight”).    6
  Finally, in the beginning of 1996 two more series were added:  The net percentage 
of respondents reporting tightening standards for consumer loans broken down between 
Credit Cards and other consumer loans.  This made the consumer lending portion of the 
survey loosely equivalent to the Commercial and Industrial portion of the survey.  The 
series are labeled “CCard tight” and “Other Cons Loans tight” in the tables of results. 
  These twelve series constitute the set of survey results tested in this paper.  The 
data set used in this paper ends in the third quart of 2005.  The series are taken from the 
Board of Governors web site. 
  Table 1 provides a list of the questions, mnemonics, series start date, sample mean 
and range characteristics. 
  Not surprisingly, the answers are frequently biased.  Figure 1 depicts the time 
series for the question asking whether credit standards are tightening for consumer loans.  
Taken at face value, it would appear that throughout practically the entire sample period, 
banks have been ever increasingly stringent in their credit card issuing standards.  There 
are two possible explanations for this result.  It could be that the banks that are answering 
the survey are all trying to exit the consumer lending business.  Or it could be that the 
respondents do not feel comfortable telling their regulator, however informally, that they 
are aggressively marketing credit cards, regardless of their actual practice.  A priori it is 
hard to believe that the overall banking industry has been systematically increasing 
consumer credit card standards since the early 1990s.  Other credit standards series have 
similar characteristics. 
 
   7
4.  The Results 
  The strategy employed is very straightforward.  A battery of standard causation 
tests are run of the general form  
 Y t = α + β(survey result)t-1  + γ(X)t-1+ ε  
where Y will take on a number of dependent variables that characterize overall economic 
activity or some measure of bank lending, the survey result is the diffusion index value of 
the relevant question, and X is a vector of control variables, in this case consisting of 
lagged Y and a measure of changes in the shape of the yield curve as measured by the 
three month – ten year treasury security rate spread.
2 
  Nine dependent variables used: growth in real GDP, growth in real private 
investment, growth in real GDP less private investment, growth in bank Commercial and 
Industrial loans, growth in real residential investment, growth in bank real estate loans, 
growth in real PCEs, growth in bank consumer loans, and growth in bank revolving 
consumer debt.  These series are taken from the FREDII database.
3 
  The battery of tests produced nine sets of tables.  Each set of tables contains two 
parts.  In the first part the twelve survey questions are used as a lagged explanatory along 
with a lagged dependent variable.  The second set adds the control of the lagged spread.  
It is these two sets of regressions that typify the sorts of questions that the survey would 
be used for:  does this quarter’s survey result help predict next quarter’s activity, and does 
this quarter’s survey result help predict next quarter’s activity after some simple control 
variables are included?   
                                                           
2 The change in the one quarter ahead Blue Chip forecast was also used in place of the yield spread as a 
control for market expectations.  There was no material difference between the two market expectation 
proxies.  The Blue Chip specific regression results are available upon request. 
3 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/   8
The results reported here are robust to the inclusion of a second lagged quarter of 
RHS variables, and do not materially change if only contemporaneous data is used.  That 
is, the battery of tests included the case where all variables are contemporaneous, the case 
of a one quarter lag for the RHS and the case of two quarterly lags.  The one period lag 
case is reported because it is quire representative of the other results and the most useful 
in practice.  The inclusion of another quarter’s lag do not change the findings reported 
here.  For the sake of completeness the test was also run with the elimination of lags; 
these produced somewhat statistically weaker results and it is difficult to think this 
specification as being operationally useful.  These additional sets of results are available 
upon request.   
  Table 2 replicates and extends the standard question asked by the existing 
literature:  does the survey add anything to predicting GDP?  The long-running 
willingness to make consumer installment loans (Winning Cons Inst) question is clearly 
and consistently providing significant information in predicting changes in real GDP.  
The shorter series questions of tightening lending standards and of increasing the lending 
spreads are often not significant, but when they are in the case of C&I lending they are of 
theoretically correct sign.   
  Table 3 repeats the process of table 2, but with the dependent variable being 
growth in private investment instead of growth in GDP.  Here it is clear that the lending 
officers know something significant.  In the first four specifications, regardless of the 
way the question of C&I lending conditions is asked, the results are statistically 
significant in their marginal predictive usefulness and of correct sign, consistent with the   9
finding of Lown, et al.  The willingness to make consumer loans series also remains 
significant. 
  The results of table 4 are intended to indicate whether the usefulness of the survey 
in predicting GDP is simply a byproduct of the survey being so informative in predicting 
the private investment component.  The dependant variable is growth in GDP without 
private investment.  Thus the test asks if the survey’s ability to predict GDP extends 
beyond the simple prediction of one of its components. The answer seems to be no.  
Aside from the willingness to make consumer loans index, the other survey variables lose 
their marginal predictive power for growth in non-investment GDP.  This result suggests 
that the forward looking prospect nature of the “willingness” question is good at 
capturing the “feeling” of the overall economy, apart from investment. 
  Table 5 examines whether the survey variables actually predict something about 
the activity of banks.  The dependent variable is the percentage growth in the banking 
sectors aggregate Commercial and Industrial loan portfolio.  As in the case of table 2, the 
lending officers are consistently significantly able to add information to the prediction of 
bank Commercial and Industrial loan activity when asked about specific market 
conditions. 
  Overall, Tables 3 – 5 suggest that there is notable explanatory power in the C& I 
series that is specific to real investments.  That is, the Senior Lending Officers know 
something significantly informative about near-term real investment.   
  Tables 6 and 7 look at real estate.  The survey is quite specific in asking if banks 
are tightening mortgage standards or if mortgage demand seems to be increasing.     10
In Table 6, interestingly, the Senior Loan Officer’s opinions regarding mortgage 
demand consistently adds to predictions of real residential activity -- an increase in 
reported demand portends an increased in residential activity -- while their view of the 
changing tightness of mortgage standards is not significant.    Moreover, the willingness 
to make consumer loans series does at least as good a job of predicting real residential 
activity, although this isn’t surprising given the general forward-looking nature of the 
question.  That tightening mortgage standards does not inform real residential activity is 
noteworthy. 
  Table 7 clouds the issue further. It examines whether the survey adds information 
in predicting the change in bank real estate loans.  The “tightness” question does not 
provide significant information, consistent with the lack of significance in predicting real 
residential activity.  The “demand” question continues to be statistically significant, but 
now with the wrong sign.  It is tempting to explain this away by noting changes in 
mortgage market structures over the sample period, or simply a small sample.  
Nonetheless, the result over the last decade-and-a-half is that the sign is significant and 
wrong.  That is, as lending officers see a pick up in the demand for mortgages, the next 
quarter sees a relative reduction in bank’s real estate lending.  
  Table 8 addresses whether any of the survey results aid in predicting real personal 
consumption expenditures, in particular the questions regarding consumer lending 
conditions.  They do not except for, again, the willingness to make consumer loans result 
which is consistently significant and in some specifications, the mortgage related 
questions are, too.  It is surprising that the survey results directed specifically at consumer   11
lending market conditions never significantly foreshadow changes in personal 
consumption expenditures. 
  Tables 9 and 10 then go on to address whether the survey results are useful in 
predicting changes in bank lending to consumers.  The dependant variable in Table 9 is 
growth in consumer loans, and in table 10 it is growth in revolving consumer debt.  Table 
9 suggests that Loan Officers perceptions of consumer loan demand is significantly 
useful for explaining growth in consumer debt, the table 10 suggests that result does not 
extend to revolving debt.  And again, not surprisingly, the willingness to make consumer 
loans series is significant for consumer loans, while no survey variable is significant in 
explaining revolving credit growth in any of the specifications. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  It is quite clear that Senior Loan Officers are in touch with changes in the overall 
pace of economic activity.  This study reaffirms the notion that innovations in the longest 
of the diffusion indices – the willingness to make consumer loans -- deserve attention.  
The “willingness” of Senior Lending Officers to make consumer loans offers insight well 
beyond consumption movements and hence changes in GDP – it does as well as the other 
survey answers in predicting the specific components that those other questions are 
specifically designed to address.  In particular, those other sector specific lending 
condition questions are rather disappointing when it comes to predicting changes in 
bank’s actual portfolios.  
Unlike the C&I market questions, where answers are met with statistically 
significant changes in lending and real activity, it is only the change in demand questions   12
that predict changes in lending for consumer loans or real estate.  The reported specific 
changes that would reflect the bank’s supply side of those markets do not appear to 
reflect any actual consequence in those specific markets. 
  Overall then, this work suggests that senior bank lending officers are quite well 
informed about the economic world outside of the banking industry, and the somewhat 
ambiguous forward looking conditions question does quite well as an all purpose 
explanatory variable.  Except for the specific case of business loans, their inside 
information of specific changes in conditions in the banking industry markets is far less 
evident.   
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Table 1 
A Summary of the Survey 






66:3 -1  63 
-79 
Tightening 
Standards for C&I 




90:2 20.1  52.6 
-24.1 
Tightening 
Standards for C&I 




90:2 20.75  52.6 
-24.1 
Demand Up for 
C&I Loans from 





91:4 5.6  45.5 
-70.2 
Demand Up for 






91:4 4.9  38.9 
-48.2 
Increasing the 
Spread for C&I 




90:2 -17.5  59 
-70.4 
Increasing the 
Spread for C&I 




















91:4 12.9  63.5 
-76.8 
Tightening 




96:1 9.3  48.9 
-8.3 
Tightening 






96:1 5.9  24.5 
-9.8 






91:4 -9.2  37.5 
-35.8   16
Table 2 
 Dependent Variable:  Growth in GDP 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals.  * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 










































































































































































































































2  .26 .24 .01 .03  .16 .15  .08  -.02  -.02  -.04  -.02  .21   17
Table 3 
Dependent Variable:  Growth in Real Private Investment 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 






































































































2 .55  .55  .29  .31  .43 .43 .34  .23  .45 .42  .23  .36 
 
 































































































































2 .54  .53  .30  .31  .43 .43 .34  .22 .44 .41  .22  .38 
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Table 4 
Dependent Variable:  Growth in (GDP less Real Private Investment) 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 









































































































2 .04  .03  .01  .01  .00  -.01  -.00  .02  .09  .06  .02  .12 
 
 

































































































































2 .02  .02  -.00  -.00  -.01  -.01  -.01  -.00  .07  .05  -.00  .12 




Dependent Variable:  Growth in C&I Loans 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 









































































































2 .80  .80  .79  .78  .80 .81 .75  .73  .68 .70  .73  .49 
 
 


































































































































2 .80  .80  .77  .78  .79 .80 .75  .73 .69 .70  .74  .48 
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Table 6 
Dependent Variable:  Growth in Real Residential Investment 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 







































































































2 .31  .31  .14  .13  .30 .30  .28  .26  .09 .09  .17  .38 
 
 
































































































































2 .30  .30  .13  .12  .29 .29 .27  .24  .08 .08  .17  .42 
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Table 7 
Dependent Variable:  Growth in Real Estate Loans 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 








































































































2 .18  .18  .14  .15  .17 .18  .17  .28  .07 .08  .18  .50 
 
 
































































































































2 .17  .17  .13  .13  .16 .17 .16  .26  .08 .10  .16  .50 




Dependent Variable:  Growth in Real PCEs 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 







































































































2 .12  .11  .00  -.01  .05  .08  .06  -.02  -.04  .01  -.02  .18 
 
 
































































































































2 .12  .11  .00  -.00  .04  .06  .05  .00  -.04  .02  -.01  .21 




Dependent Variable:  Growth in Consumer Loans 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 









































































































2 .27  .27  .20  .20  .28 .27 .32  .20  .16 .06  .33  ..57 
 
 


































































































































2 .27  .28  .23  .26  .30 .29 .35 .24 .23 .15  .32  .57 
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Table 10 
Dependent Variable:  Growth in Revolving Consumer Debt 
 
Note for all Tables:  Cells associated with estimated coefficients contain the estimate and standard error, both rounded to four decimals. * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1%. 
 
 








































































































2 .48  .48  .53  .52  .49 .48 .47  .52  .13 .10  .51  .01 
 
 



































































































































2 .47  .47  .53  .51  .48 .47 .46  .52  .27 .25  .51  .01 
 